TY - GEN
T1 - Dynamic Resilient Network Games Considering Connectivity
AU - Nugraha, Yurid
AU - Cetinkaya, Ahmet
AU - Hayakawa, Tomohisa
AU - Ishii, Hideaki
AU - Zhu, Quanyan
N1 - Funding Information:
Yurid Nugraha and Tomohisa Hayakawa are with the Department of Systems and Control Engineering, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo 152-8552, Japan. yurid@dsl.sc.e.titech.ac.jp, hayakawa@sc.e.titech.ac.jp Ahmet Cetinkaya is with the Information Systems Architecture Science Research Division, National Institute of Informatics, Tokyo 101-8430, Japan. cetinkaya@nii.ac.jp Hideaki Ishii is with the Department of Computer Science, Tokyo Insitute of Technology, Yokohama 226-8502, Japan. ishii@c.titech.ac.jp Quanyan Zhu is with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, New York University, Brooklyn, NY 11201, USA. quanyan.zhu@nyu.edu This work was supported in part by the JST CREST Grant No. JP-MJCR15K3, by JST ERATO HASUO Metamathematics for Systems Design Project (No. JPMJER1603), by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers 20K14771 and 18H01460, and by National Science Foundation (NSF) under Grants CNS-1544782 and ECCS-1847056.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 IEEE.
PY - 2020/12/14
Y1 - 2020/12/14
N2 - To address cyber security issues in multi-agent type systems, we formulate a game theoretic problem on resilient graphs, where the utilities of the players are mainly related to the connectivity of the network. An attacker is capable to disconnect part of the edges of the graph by emitting jamming signals while, in response, the defender recovers some of them by increasing the transmitted power for the communication over the corresponding edges. The players' actions are constrained by their energy for transmissions and they play this two-stage game repeatedly over time. Their strategies are characterized by the edge connectivity and the timings to start/stop their actions. A numerical example is provided to demonstrate the efficacy of the results.
AB - To address cyber security issues in multi-agent type systems, we formulate a game theoretic problem on resilient graphs, where the utilities of the players are mainly related to the connectivity of the network. An attacker is capable to disconnect part of the edges of the graph by emitting jamming signals while, in response, the defender recovers some of them by increasing the transmitted power for the communication over the corresponding edges. The players' actions are constrained by their energy for transmissions and they play this two-stage game repeatedly over time. Their strategies are characterized by the edge connectivity and the timings to start/stop their actions. A numerical example is provided to demonstrate the efficacy of the results.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85099877491&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1109/CDC42340.2020.9304479
DO - 10.1109/CDC42340.2020.9304479
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85099877491
T3 - Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
SP - 3779
EP - 3784
BT - 2020 59th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2020
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 59th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2020
Y2 - 14 December 2020 through 18 December 2020
ER -