TY - GEN
T1 - Subgame perfect equilibrium analysis for jamming attacks on resilient graphs
AU - Nugraha, Yurid
AU - Hayakawa, Tomohisa
AU - Cetinkaya, Ahmet
AU - Ishii, Hideaki
AU - Zhu, Quanyan
N1 - Funding Information:
This work was supported in the part by the JST CREST Grant No. JPMJCR15K3.
Funding Information:
Yurid Nugraha and Tomohisa Hayakawa are with the Department of Systems and Control Engineering, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo 152-8552, Japan. yurid@dsl.sc.e.titech.ac.jp, hayakawa@sc.e.titech.ac.jp Ahmet Cetinkaya and Hideaki Ishii are with the Department of Computer Science, Tokyo Insitute of Technology, Yokohama, 226-8502, Japan. ahmet@sc.dis.titech.ac.jp, ishii@c.titech.ac.jp Quanyan Zhu is with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, New York University, Brooklyn NY, 11201, USA. quanyan.zhu@nyu.edu This work was supported in the part by the JST CREST Grant No. JPMJCR15K3.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 American Automatic Control Council.
PY - 2019/7
Y1 - 2019/7
N2 - A cyber security problem is considered in a networked system formulated as a resilient graph problem based on a game theoretic approach. The connectivity of the underlying graph of the network system is reduced by an attacker who removes some of the edges whereas the defender attempts to recover them. Both players are subject to energy constraints so that their actions are restricted and cannot be performed continuously. We provide a subgame perfect equilibrium analysis and fully characterize the optimal strategies for the attacker and the defender in terms of edge connectivity and the number of connected components of the graph. The resilient graph game is then applied to the multiagent consensus problem. We study how the attacks and the recovery on the edges affect the consensus process.
AB - A cyber security problem is considered in a networked system formulated as a resilient graph problem based on a game theoretic approach. The connectivity of the underlying graph of the network system is reduced by an attacker who removes some of the edges whereas the defender attempts to recover them. Both players are subject to energy constraints so that their actions are restricted and cannot be performed continuously. We provide a subgame perfect equilibrium analysis and fully characterize the optimal strategies for the attacker and the defender in terms of edge connectivity and the number of connected components of the graph. The resilient graph game is then applied to the multiagent consensus problem. We study how the attacks and the recovery on the edges affect the consensus process.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85061985834&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.23919/acc.2019.8814607
DO - 10.23919/acc.2019.8814607
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85061985834
T3 - Proceedings of the American Control Conference
SP - 2060
EP - 2065
BT - 2019 American Control Conference, ACC 2019
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 2019 American Control Conference, ACC 2019
Y2 - 10 July 2019 through 12 July 2019
ER -